Do the economics of bike-sharing schemes stack up?

O Bike in Sydney. Image: Getty.

Have you ever walked past (or tripped over) a shared bike and wondered how it’s possible for the business to survive with a ride costing so little?

While bike-share schemes attract controversy in some places, the economic models behind such schemes actually have more to do with data mining, advertising and turning a profit from interest on the deposits than from the bike rental itself.

The most recent example in my own part of the world is Obikes. Launched in Australia in mid-June, there are currently over 1,250 dock-less Obikes in Melbourne and over 1,000 in Sydney. According to its marketing director, Obike’s Australian user numbers have increased rapidly since its introduction.

However, despite the promise of cheap and convenient access to bikes, Obikes have faced a number of challenges since their very first few weeks of operation. There have been complaints about Obikes clogging footpaths and becoming hazards as a result of people failing to park them within designated spaces, as well as complaints about Obikes hogging existing parking racks, leaving inadequate space for commuter cyclists to park their own bikes.

The massive potential for bike share schemes expansion

In theory, there are plenty of possible ways to make a profit from the shared-bike business. Its lucrative business models have proved attractive to entrepreneurs and investors.


The ride-and-pay model is the most straightforward profit-generating operation - but only one method of making the schemes profitable. For example, a half-hour ride of an Obike will cost the user A$1.99. If a bike is used for 10 half-hour trips per day, the total daily return will be A$19.9. A three-month operation could collect A$1,791. This will cover the initial investment made on the bikes, as well as some operational costs such as lost bikes and repairs - depending on the frequency of bike usage per day.

Bike-share schemes can also cash in on the deposits they require from users. The majority of schemes require users to register and pay a refundable security deposit to use the shared bikes (Obike asks for a deposit of A$69). Collectively, the amount of money held in the deposit pool is potentially enormous.

One Chinese bike-share company, Mobike, reportedly had over 100m registered users in June this year. The Mobike deposit account therefore held over 30bn yuan (about A$6bn) paid by the 100m users at 299 yuan per user. The interest earned from this sum alone is a huge income-generating asset, not to mention the scope to invest this money while it’s held in company coffers.

Data services present another significant potential income stream. The user database is huge – more than 100m trackable users in the case of Mobike. This can be used for marketing and the analysis of consumer behaviour if combined with other data sets.

Users’ riding behaviour data, captured by apps and GPS, complement very well the data sets collected from taxi and public transport systems by focusing on smaller areas. This data has a high commercial value to businesses in retail, restaurants and even car sales, as well as to local governments seeking more detailed information for urban planning and management applications.

Advertising is another means to generate profit by using both the physical body of the bikes to advertise as well as the app used to locate and unlock the bikes. However, the limited usable space on a bike and the short interaction time between the user and the app make it hard to generate significant income this way.

Teething problems persist but bike-share schemes likely to keep growing

In Beijing and Shanghai, where dockless shared bikes were first introduced, bikes have been thrown into rivers, garbage dumps and even into trees. Pedestrians are forced to push their way through swathes of parked dockless shared bikes, often leaving behind a trail of fallen bikes or bikes stacked on top of one another on footpaths. The Hangzhou government has seized tens of thousands of shared bikes in an attempt to reinforce bike parking laws.

Melbourne Lord Mayor Robert Doyle has complained that Obikes are the source of so much clutter that he has threatened to ban them altogether.

In spite of these ongoing problems, bike-share schemes continue to grow into new markets globally, with new schemes in Florence and Milan the latest examples. At the same time, withdrawals from the market by less competitive or poorly executed models are occurring.

Local controversies over shared-bike schemes are expressions of how resident behaviour, municipal bylaws and cycling infrastructure are all too often proving to be unprepared to embrace and support a new mode of urban transport.

The ConversationPublic and local government criticisms and complaints may delay (or in extreme cases) even ban the bikes from particular cities. But as long as the interest for capital expansion and the broad social, environmental and health benefits are recognised, these schemes will continue to grow globally.

Sun Sheng Han is professor of urban planning at the University of Melbourne.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

 
 
 
 

The Tory manifesto promises to both increase AND decrease the rate of housebuilding

Housing secretary Robert Jenrick. Image: Getty.

In his 2014 Mansion House speech, the then-chancellor George Osborne expressed with uncharacteristic honesty the motives at the heart of how the Conservatives see British housing politics: “The British people want our homes to go up in value, but also remain affordable; and we want more homes built, just not next to us.”

Five years later these contradictions remain unreconciled and present in their manifesto, which contains two different and contradictory – but clearly extensively targeted and focus-grouped – sets of policies.

The Conservatives have two housing targets. The first is to make significant progress to hitting “our target of 300,000 houses built a year by the mid-2020s”. The second is their aim to build “at least a million new homes” during the next parliament, which implies a target of 200,000 homes a year. This is not only 100,000 lower than their initial target but also lower than the current rate of housebuilding: 213,660 new homes a year. They have therefore implied at separate points in the same manifesto that they intend to simultaneously increase and decrease the rate of housebuilding.  

There are similar conflicts in their approach to planning. They intend to make the “planning system simpler” while simultaneously aiming to introduce community-led design standards for development and planning obligations to provide infrastructure for the local community.

None of this is unsurprising, The Tories don’t seem to know if they want to build more houses or not – so of course they don’t know whether they wish to make it easier or harder to do so.  

Politicians like obfuscation on housing policy to placate NIMBY voters. Take for example prospective Conservative MP and ‘environmentalist’ Zac Goldsmith’s crusade to save treasured local car parks. The manifesto can equally be accused of pandering to NIMBY instincts, protecting their shire voters from all housing, including ones they might actually need or want, by promising to protect the greenbelt.  

Instead, Conservatives intend to foist development on Labour-leaning inner-city communities and prioritising brownfield development and “urban regeneration”. This requires massive, infeasible increases in proposed density on brownfield sites – and research by Shelter has shown there are simply not enough brownfield sites in cities like London. Consequently, it is not clear how such a policy can co-exist with giving these inner-city communities rights on local design. Perhaps they intend to square that circle through wholesale adoption of YIMBY proposals to let residents on each street opt to pick a design code and the right to turn their two-storey semi-detached suburban houses into a more walkable, prettier street of five-storey terraces or mansion blocks. If so, they have not spelt that out. 

Many complain of NIMBYism at a local level and its toxic effects on housing affordability. But NIMBYism at the national level – central government desire to restrict housebuilding to make house prices rise – is the unspoken elephant in the room. After all, 63 per cent of UK voters are homeowners and price rises caused by a housing shortage are hardly unpopular with them. 


There is anecdotal evidence that protecting or inflating the value of homeowners’ assets is central to Conservative strategy. When George Osborne was criticised for the inflation his help to buy policy caused within the housing market, he allegedly told the Cabinet: “Hopefully we will get a little housing boom, and everyone will be happy as property values go up”. More recently Luke Barratt of Inside Housing noted that most Conservatives he spoke to at the 2018 party conference were scared “they’d be punished by their traditional voters if the values of their homes were to fall”. He was told by a Conservative activist at the conference that, “If you build too many houses, you get a Labour government”.

But the senior figures in the Conservative Party are painfully aware that the continuing housing shortage presents major long-term problems for the Party. As the manifesto itself acknowledges: “For the UK to unleash its potential, young people need the security of knowing that homeownership is within their reach.” Perpetual increases in house prices are incompatible with this goal. The problem has greatly contributed to the Conservatives’ severe unpopularity with a younger generation priced out of decent accommodation. 

Equally, there is increasing evidence that ‘gains’ from rising house prices are disproportionately concentrated in the south of England.  The differences in housing costs between regions greatly reduce labour mobility, suppressing wage growth in the north and midlands, which in turn leads to greater regional inequality. The policy of coddling southern homeowners at the expense of the economic well-being of other regions is a major long-term stumbling block to Conservative desires to make inroads into the ‘red wall’ of Leave-voting labour seats outside the south.

Before dealing with the issue of where housing should go, you must decide whether you want to build enough housing to reduce the housing crisis. On this issue, the Conservative response is, “Perhaps”. In contrast, even though they may not know where to put the necessary housing, the Labour Party at least has a desire in the abstract to deal with the crisis, even if the will to fix it, in reality, remains to be seen. 

Ultimately the Conservative Party seems to want to pay lip service to the housing crisis without stopping the ever-upward march of prices, underpinned by a needless shortage. Osborne’s dilemma – that the will of much of his party’s voter base clashes with the need to provide adequate housing – remains at the heart of Conservative housing policy. The Conservatives continue to hesitate, which is of little comfort to those who suffer because of a needless and immoral housing shortage.

Sam Watling is the director of Brighton Yimby, a group which aims to solve Brighton’s housing crisis while maintaining the character of the Sussex countryside.