How is Britain's ageing population changing its cities?

Some old people. Image: Getty.

Britain’s population is ageing and the implications are wide-ranging. Using population projections to 2036, we can see how this major demographic shift will affect cities and rural areas both in relative (i.e. increasing share of people who are over 65) and absolute terms (i.e. increasing number of older people).

First, a note on methodology. My analysis is based on dependency ratios, a measure of social support need expressed as a ratio of the number of people aged over 65 to that of people between 16 and 64. (A value of 0 per cent means that there are no people over 65 in an area, while a value of 100 per cent means that there are as many people over 65 as there are between 16 and 64.)

I also distinguish between 109 coastal and 271 non-coastal areas. Coastal areas are all those UK local authorities whose territory meets the sea, for whatever length or proportion of the total.

Each local authority is assigned a Rural-Urban Classification score, calculated by the ONS for England and Wales. Using the same approach, it is possible to estimate a score for Scottish local authorities. Urban areas data are based on Primary Urban Areas.

The results

Two trends clearly emerge when analysing dependency ratio at the rural/urban and coastal/non-coastal level. First, in 2036 coastal locations in Britain consistently show higher dependency ratios compared to non-coastal areas. Second, there is an almost linear relationship between an area’s degree of urbanisation and its dependency ratio. Both trends are easily spotted in this chart:

Figure 1: Dependency ratio by local authorities’ degree of urbanisation, unweighted average. Click to expand. Source: ONS, NRS, Statistics for Wales, NLP analysis. 

This rural-urban trend is even more evident in the next chart, which shows how all local authorities in Britain will score in terms of their dependency ratio in 2036, and the proportional increase in number of people over 65 in 2036, compared to 2016 levels. Broadly, a higher degree of urbanisation corresponds to lower dependency ratios, despite higher proportional increases in people over 65 by 2036.

Figure 2: Dependency ratios and increase in older people in Britain’s local authorities, by rural-urban classification. Click to expand.

In short, what is expected to be a national demographic shift will have diverse implications at the local level. Crucially, rural authorities may have more difficulties in providing adequate adult social care in the future, given that in some areas there will be an average of 7 older people for every 10 people of working age. Also, all other things being equal, coastal areas’ finances could be under greater pressure than their non-coastal counterparts.

In theory, adult social care costs should not be as pressing for urban areas. Given their relatively lower dependency ratios (a good proxy for economic activity) and the ability to increase Council Tax by up to 2 per cent each year and to retain business rates from 2020 (see page 4, here), urban areas’ finances could be better placed to meet the increasing pressures of adult social care expenditure –  if not comfortably, at least more so than rural authorities would.

However, cities will likewise face the pressure of planning to house an ageing population. Both in relative terms (see Figure 2 above) and absolute terms (see size of bubbles in Figure 3 below), urban areas will experience the strongest growth in the number of people over 65.

Average dependency ratio by local authorities’ degree of urbanisation and number of people aged over 65 (expressed via size of the bubbles). Click to expand. Source: ONS, NRS, Statistics for Wales, NLP analysis.

Failure to meet the housing needs of this older cohort could lead to future increases in adult social care costs for urban local authorities, which have already been hit by budget cuts since 2009-10 and have almost unanimously increased Council Tax by 2 per cent, once given the opportunity to do so, to meet the rising costs of adult care (again, see page 4 here).

Ageing cities

As Britain grows older its cities age too. Dependency ratios will increase in all of the largest urban areas in Britain between 2016 and 2036. And the substantial absolute increase in the number of older people (from +38 per cent in Birmingham and Leeds to +64 per cent in London; see Figure 4)

Despite this, the influx of younger, working people would keep the increasing dependency ratios relatively low (between 23 per cent in London and 40 per cent in Newcastle) even by 2036.

Dependency ratios and increase in older people in selected urban areas. Click to expand. Source: ONS, NRS, Statistics for Wales, NLP analysis.

One of the main challenges of this increase will be meeting older people’s specialist housing needs, especially at a time when housing costs are rising for all age cohorts and all tenures (albeit at different rates in the North, the Midlands and the South of England).

Almost 4.3m people over 65 will live in Britain’s largest cities by 2036 (up from around 2.9m). National and local governments must ensure that the housing stock will be large enough – and of “good enough” quality – to accommodate them all, as the cost of not meeting these needs would be borne by local authorities via adult social care expenditure.


In sum, the same demographic shift is expected to impact differently on cities than it will on rural areas – and on coastal locations compared to non-coastal ones. Urban areas are likely to see pressure on their housing market increase, while rural areas will need to find solutions to cover rising adult social care costs, as older people will make up an increasing share of the local population.

This challenge highlights the difficulty of devising a national housing policy, since any intervention by the government will have implications for local governments’ finances and for the housing market. Building more homes may not be the single solution to solve Britain’s ageing-related issues, but it does seem a very sensible starting point.

Francesco Mellino is a research consultant at Nathaniel Lichfield & Partners. This article was originally posted on the planning consultancy's blog.

To gain a fuller picture of the implications of an ageing population in Great Britain, you can also read our Research Note.

 
 
 
 

How the rise of anti-crime politics caused lasting harm to Black Americans

"I see an awareness that has developed in the Black community in the last 10 years or so about how deeply racist the criminal justice system has become," James Forman Jr. says. (David McNew/Getty Images)

The police killing of George Floyd, and the protest movement that emerged from it, has reinvigorated a national conversation around reinventing criminal justice policy in the United States.

At the same time, reports that violent crime is rising in many US cities have resurrected talk of the much-disputed “Ferguson effect,” a theory put forward by law enforcement professionals, and some researchers, who argued that police slowdowns in the wake of the first wave of Black Lives Matter protests resulted in elevated rates of violent crime. President Donald Trump is trying to weaponise this narrative, paired with images of federal officers clashing with protesters in the streets of Portland, to wage a 1968-style backlash election campaign.

“People who want to mobilise a lock-them-up style of either policing or prosecution have tried to weaponise those short-term increases,” says James Forman Jr., professor of law at Yale Law School. “Criminologists will say you have to be very, very cautious about short-term movement [in crime statistics]. We don't know whether or not what we're seeing right now [with violent crime increasing] is going to sustain itself. But the fact is, it's here and people are talking about it.”

In 2018, Forman won the Pulitzer Prize in nonfiction for his book Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black America. Drawing on his experience as a public defender in Washington, DC, he traced the emergence of anti-crime politics in late 20th century Black communities. Forman showed how newly empowered Black politicians fought for policies they believed would protect and uplift Black Americans, but inadvertently contributed to mass incarceration. 


CityMetric recently caught up with Forman to discuss crime trends, where he sees reason for hope in this moment and how the Black political class’s attitude toward crime and punishment has shifted since the latter part of the 20th century. 

This interview has been edited and condensed. 

There is talk right now about a resurgence of crime and violence in American cities. We saw similar, more localised concerns after the initial 2015 Black Lives Matter protests in Ferguson and Baltimore. Do you fear this could reinvigorate the kind of politics you describe in your book among segments of the Black community and political class?

I fear that it could be reinvigorated nationally and also in the Black political class. Look at the political conversations that are happening in Atlanta right now, for example, a city that also has seen a short-term uptick in crime as it is a site of a lot of protests about George Floyd and Breonna Taylor on the national level, as well as Rayshard Brooks and Ahmaud Arbery more locally in Georgia.

I think that you can already see in some of the language of the local elected officials this idea that we have to be very careful about pulling back. [They are saying] “while the protesters may make some valid points, we can't risk returning to the ‘80s and ‘90s.” Those decades really traumatised the United States, and particularly traumatised Black communities. There's a deep fear about returning to the levels of the violence that we saw in the crack years.

You write a lot about class divides among Black Americans, where middle income and elite Black people don't suffer as much from extremely punitive policies. They also have closer ties to the politicians who are creating these policies. There are very specific groups of people, even in marginalised communities, whose voices are heard.  As a result of these dynamics, you write about Black politicians fighting for things like mandatory minimum prison sentences or against decriminalising marijuana. Is there still that disconnect between those who suffer the most from criminal justice policies and those who are actually heard in political discourse?  

Let me just say a caveat, that when we talk about class divisions in the Black community it's important to hold two truths in our head at the same time. Bruce Western and others have shown the way in which class, educational status, income can dramatically reduce the likelihood of being hardest hit by the criminal system – namely incarcerated. Middle class and upper middle class Black people get some measure of protection. It's also true at the same time that Black people of all classes are worse off relative to their class counterparts in the white community. 

One area where class is least protective is policing and police stops. The police do not know how many degrees you have. They don't know how much money you have in your bank account. I want to be very clear that in making this point about class, I'm not making the argument that race or racism don't matter in this context. 

In terms of how it plays out now, I see an awareness that has developed in the Black community in the last 10 years or so about how deeply racist the criminal justice system has become. Twenty or 30 years ago they had a consciousness, but there's levels of understanding. Many of the people I write about in the book wanted to promote the interests of the Black community. They weren't motivated by indifference or callousness. When presented with mounting evidence of how awful this system has been in Black lives, they're reconsidering and recalibrating. 

Lots of former elected officials have said to me some version of “I didn't know at the time and I appreciate that you showed us in our full complexity. I appreciate that you showed the pressures we were under. If I had known then what I know now, maybe I would have been less quick to go along with some of these harsh measures.” 

The second thing that has affected the Black political class has been the emerging movements, led by Black people in particular and led by young people. They not only educated leaders, but pressured them and made them understand that there is a political cost. If you're not moved by the moral argument, then you'll be moved by the political argument. You'll be moved by the people protesting outside the office of District Attorney Jackie Lacey in Los Angeles, for example, where Black Lives Matter LA has held, I believe, a year of consecutive protests against a Black district attorney who has had really some of the worst practices.

From what I can tell, she's been pressured by the movement to change some of her positions on important issues like prosecution of low-level drug offenders, for example, and the aggressiveness with which she prosecutes police officers for acts of violence.

What do you make of the calls to defend or even abolish the police?

What I find so compelling about abolition, initially in the prison context and extended to the police as well, is that it shifts the conversation and forces us to go through experiments in which we imagine what it would take to build that world. I think that exercise is very important, because it pushes us further than we are naturally inclined to go. Cultivating a broader imagination is an incredibly important part of this work, because as you know from my book, often it was lack of imagination that caused people to fall back on [punitive policies]. 

That's what caused D.C. Councilmember David Clarke to call the police rather than public health experts when he was overwhelmed with letters about heroin addicts in public space. He was anti-drug war, but he couldn't imagine responding to a call for help with heroin addicts with anything other than police. That's a very common move from even really good and progressive people. 

People who are for defunding, for abolition, are absolutely right about reinvesting that money into alternative structures that support communities. But the reinvestment part doesn't follow naturally from the terms. We might want to come up with a term that captures the new stuff we want to do. I think that's particularly important because one of the reasons Black communities have ended up supporting more police is that Black communities have always wanted their fair share of the resources.

Then, the evidence suggests the United States has too many police officers doing prophylactic, preventative, or stop-and-frisk style policing. The style of policing that leads to district level harassment, pulling people over for no reason. But we have too little investment in the parts of police departments that investigate unsolved crimes. I'm talking about the investigator or the detective who comes to your house after there's been a robbery, an assault, a rape, or homicide. 

As compared to European countries, in the United States we actually underinvest in those parts of our police departments. Jill Leovy’s book Ghettoside shows this in dramatic detail. She describes an LAPD that's stopping and frisking Black drivers wantonly and yet the homicide detectives are still relying on a fax machine and the fax machine is broken. They have to go with their own money to Staples to buy a printer. Meanwhile, other aspects of the department are kitted out in this ridiculous riot gear that makes them look like they're in Fallujah. 

That under investment is particularly damaging to Black communities because we're disproportionately victimised by crime. Because of racism and this allocation of resources, the police are less likely to respond in Black communities. The kids I used to work with in the charter schools in DC, we talk about no snitching, but one of the reasons they would never call the police after they'd been victimised by crime is they would say, “They're not even going to come. You're wasting time.” 

I did a Q&A with Jill Leovy too and her argument is one I've struggled to articulate in our present moment. She argues the state doesn't have a monopoly on violence in low-income Black neighbourhoods, because investigations of violence are deemphasised and crime victims or their loved ones often take retribution into their own hands.  But right now, establishing or preserving the state's monopoly on violence isn't an appealing talking point. 

Yes, this is another thing nobody's talking about. Whatever we're going to do instead of the police has to be accountable to the public. The best, most direct way to have accountability is to have the individuals be public employees. As long as we have 300 million guns in this country at least some of those state employees are going to themselves be armed. It's unreasonable to ask them to do the job without it. Not as many need to be armed as are armed now, but some of them need to be. But they can't be hiding behind union contracts or civil service protections which make it impossible to remove even the worst performing, most abusive officers. 

We can not call them police if we want to. That's semantic, but maybe symbolism matters. But those people have to be state employees. They can work with community-based nonprofits, but there are also communities that don't have as robust of a nonprofit network, and they deserve protection too. These [community] groups have to be accountable to the state and, when they don't exist, the state has to be there. 

Progressives get all the points I just made when it's applied to education. The notion that things be public and accountable to the state is understood when it comes to schools. It's exactly why so many people on the left are opposed to charter schools, because they say they don't have public accountability. They want these things to be a state function. But this point about the difficulty in removing this entirely from the hands of the state is, I think, one that liberals and progressives understand from other contexts.

Jake Blumgart is a staff writer at CityMetric.