Five thoughts about Theresa May’s promise to get councils building houses again

The silliest picture of Theresa May giving her speech we could find. Image: Getty.

1. This is big.

Housing is a policy area infested with numbers that sound big but actually aren’t. “An extra 50,000 homes!” is a lot of homes – except we need to be building 200,000-300,000 a year, so it actually isn’t. By the same token, the government’s recent promise of an extra £2bn for affordable housing sounds huge – except it’s spread over 10 years, and is a tiny fraction of the amount the previous chancellor George Osborne cut from the relevant budgets.

In fairness, though, one should acknowledge when things that sounds small are actually big – and the housing policy Theresa May announced in her speech to Tory conference in Birmingham earlier today appears to be one of them. Here’s the key quote:

“The last time Britain was building enough homes – half a century ago – local councils made a big contribution. We’ve opened-up the £9bn Affordable Housing Programme to councils, to get them building again. And at last year’s conference I announced an additional £2bn for affordable housing.

“But something is still holding many of them back. There is a government cap on how much they can borrow against their Housing Revenue Account assets to fund new developments.

“Solving the housing crisis is the biggest domestic policy challenge of our generation. It doesn’t make sense to stop councils from playing their part in solving it.

“So today I can announce that we are scrapping that cap.”

If we take this at face value – a fairly big if – it potentially means that ambitious councils could borrow money against future rents and use it to start building again, at significant scale. And that will give them more rents, which means they can borrow more money.

And that, unlike the £2bn, really is quite a big deal.

2. It’ll allow counter-cyclical building, and so make the market more resilient.

One of problems with the way Britain’s housing market is currently constituted is that it’s so painfully cyclical. Construction firms outbid each other for promising plots of land, pushing the price up in the process – but that locks them into particular sales price targets for the homes they build on that land. If house prices fall, firms will stop building, until they start to rise again. We’re stuck.

Empowering councils will help to break that cycle, by ensuring that there are bodies with an interest in building new homes, even in down years. And so, if the government is serious about increasing the number of new homes this country builds, this is a good way to do it.

3. It’s actually not that big a surprise.

One of the things that caught me off guard at Tory conference last year was when an elderly man who had held senior roles in several ultra-Thatcherite think tanks told me he thought the state should build homes again. This wasn’t the only time I heard this from a Tory, but he was one of the most surprising Tories to hear it from.

So in some ways, this isn’t actually that radical a shift from May, merely a reflection of where Tory thinking had got to.


4. It amounts to devolving the debt.

While chancellor, George Osborne famously “devolved the axe” – slashing council budgets in an attempt to ensure his cuts were viewed as a local, not national, government phenomenon. It worked, in so far as councils are struggling on with about half the money they used to have, and are only now starting to fall over.

But fall over they will: only Northamptonshire has gone so far, but no one in local government thinks it’ll be the last. A few weeks back, the thought occurred to me that, when taxes are raised to stem the ensuing crisis, a canny chancellor might devolve that, too: granting a measure of fiscal autonomy to councils not because they believed in devolution, but because they didn’t want the blame for the inevitable tax rises.

We are some way off that, still, but this is a policy of the same flavour. Fixing the housing crisis will require the state to borrow, in direct contravention of the logic that has dominated Tory economic policy for last decade. But it doesn’t have to be the nation state doing that borrowing: why not let councils do it instead?

5. I have questions about capacity.

The devil in these things always in the detail. It’s easy to make a speech (although 2017 Theresa May might disagree); actually turning it into policy a different thing. Perhaps the Treasury will reassert itself: perhaps councils won’t simply be able to borrow as much as they want against rental income, but will be constrained in some way. We’ll see.

There’s another question: back in the days when councils used to be biggest builders in Britain, every local authority had an enormous store of in-house expertise to draw on: not just planners but architects, surveyors, and everyone else involved in creating new housing. Most councils don’t have that any more: construction expertise is now concentrated overwhelmingly in the private sector. That may yet limit the amount of homes that councils can bring forward in the short term.

All that said, if you care about solving the housing crisis, this looks suspiciously like good news. So, yay, say I.

Jonn Elledge is the editor of CityMetric. He is on Twitter as @jonnelledge and on Facebook as JonnElledgeWrites.

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What’s killing northerners?

The Angel of the North. Image: Getty.

There is a stark disparity in wealth and health between people in the north and south of England, commonly referred to as England’s “north-south divide”. The causes of this inequality are complex; it’s influenced by the environment, jobs, migration and lifestyle factors – as well as the long-term political power imbalances, which have concentrated resources and investment in the south, especially in and around London.

Life expectancy is also lower in the north, mainly because the region is more deprived. But new analysis of national mortality data highlights a shockingly large mortality gap between young adults, aged 25 to 44, living in the north and south of England. This gap first emerged in the late 1990s, and seems to have been growing ever since.

In 1995, there were 2% more deaths among northerners aged 25 to 34 than southerners (in other words, 2% “excess mortality”). But by 2015, northerners in this age group were 29% more likely to die than their southern counterparts. Likewise, in the 35 to 44 age group, there was 3% difference in mortality between northerners and southerners in 1995. But by 2015, there were 49% more deaths among northerners than southerners in this age group.

Excess mortality in the north compared with south of England by age groups, from 1965 to 2015. Follow the lines to see that people born around 1980 are the ones most affected around 2015.

While mortality increased among northerners aged 25 to 34, and plateaued among 35 to 44-year-olds, southern mortality mainly declined across both age groups. Overall, between 2014 and 2016, northerners aged 25 to 44 were 41% more likely to die than southerners in the same age group. In real terms, this means that between 2014 and 2016, 1,881 more women and 3,530 more men aged between 25 and 44 years died in the north, than in the south.

What’s killing northerners?

To understand what’s driving this mortality gap among young adults, our team of researchers looked at the causes of death from 2014 to 2016, and sorted them into eight groups: accidents, alcohol related, cardiovascular related (heart conditions, diabetes, obesity and so on), suicide, drug related, breast cancer, other cancers and other causes.

Controlling for the age and sex of the population in the north and the south, we found that it was mostly the deaths of northern men contributing to the difference in mortality – and these deaths were caused mainly by cardiovascular conditions, alcohol and drug misuse. Accidents (for men) and cancer (for women) also played important roles.

From 2014 to 2016, northerners were 47% more likely to die for cardiovascular reasons, 109% for alcohol misuse and 60% for drug misuse, across both men and women aged 25 to 44 years old. Although the national rate of death from cardiovascular reasons has dropped since 1981, the longstanding gap between north and south remains.

Death and deprivation

The gap in life expectancy between north and south is usually put down to socioeconomic deprivation. We considered further data for 2016, to find out if this held true for deaths among young people. We found that, while two thirds of the gap were explained by the fact that people lived in deprived areas, the remaining one third could be caused by some unmeasured form of deprivation, or by differences in culture, infrastructure, migration or extreme weather.

Mortality for people aged 25 to 44 years in 2016, at small area geographical level for the whole of England.

Northern men faced a higher risk of dying young than northern women – partly because overall mortality rates are higher for men than for women, pretty much at every age, but also because men tend to be more susceptible to socioeconomic pressures. Although anachronistic, the expectation to have a job and be able to sustain a family weighs more on men. Accidents, alcohol misuse, drug misuse and suicide are all strongly associated with low socioeconomic status.

Suicide risk is twice as high among the most deprived men, compared to the most affluent. Suicide risk has also been associated with unemployment, and substantial increases in suicide have been observed during periods of recession – especially among men. Further evidence tells us that unskilled men between ages 25 and 39 are between ten and 20 times more likely to die from alcohol-related causes, compared to professionals.

Alcohol underpins the steep increase in liver cirrhosis deaths in Britain from the 1990s – which is when the north-south divide in mortality between people aged 25 to 44 also started to emerge. Previous research has shown that men in this age group, who live in the most deprived areas, are five times more likely to die from alcohol-related diseases than those in the most affluent areas. For women in deprived areas, the risk is four times greater.


It’s also widely known that mortality rates for cancer are higher in more deprived areas, and people have worse survival rates in places where smoking and alcohol abuse is more prevalent. Heroin and crack cocaine addiction and deaths from drug overdoses are also strongly associated with deprivation.

The greater number of deaths from accidents in the north should be considered in the context of transport infrastructure investment, which is heavily skewed towards the south – especially London, which enjoys the lowest mortality in the country. What’s more, if reliable and affordable public transport is not available, people will drive more and expose themselves to higher risk of an accident.

Deaths for young adults in the north of England have been increasing compared to those in the south since the late 1990s, creating new health divides between England’s regions. It seems that persistent social, economic and health inequalities are responsible for a growing trend of psychological distress, despair and risk taking among young northerners. Without major changes, the extreme concentration of power, wealth and opportunity in the south will continue to damage people’s health, and worsen the north-south divide.

The Conversation

Evangelos Kontopantelis, Professor in Data Science and Health Services Research, University of Manchester

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.