Of course London gets more transport funding than the north. It's addicted to it

Greater Leeds is thought to be the largest city in Europe without some form of metro network. Image: Rept0n1x/Wikimedia Commons.

Yesterday, IPPR North, the arm of the centre left think tank concerned with, well, you can guess, put out a rather depressing report about the north-south divide in England's transport funding.

Its researchers crunched the numbers on where public spending on transport across the country was going, and found a gap big enough you could lose a whole fleet of trains down there. Some key points:

  • The total cost of London's Crossrail between this financial year (2016-17) and 2020-21 will be £4.6bn – more than the £4.3bn going to all transport projects in the entire north over the same period. 
  • The £1,900 spent on transport for every Londoner is more than six times the per head funding on offer in the North East (£300) and North West (£290). It's nearly eight times as as the £250 per head on offer in Yorkshire & the Humber.
  • That actually looks generous compared to other regions, like the South West (£219) and East Midlands (£193). 

Here's the inevitable chart:

Click to expand.

I have some quibbles about this. Crossrail will actually extend outside London into the East of England (two stops in Essex) and South East (eight stops in Berkshire and Buckinghamshire which are, confusingly, given the region's name, to the west of London; I don't make the rules). It's not clear the IPPR figures have accounted for this: Crossrail is mostly an investment in the London region, but it isn't that entirely.

Nonetheless, it's very clear that London is swallowing a massively disproportionate share of Britain's transport funding. This is clearly unfair. 

Yet it's also, I fear, very unlikely to change. The concentration of transport funding in London is politically inevitable, and for at least four different reasons.


1) Population

London is big: nearly 9m people live in the capital proper, and a few million more in the commuter towns beyond. It's probably the most populous of England's eight official regions (we're between censuses so we're not sure, but in 2011 it was only half a million behind the South East, and has almost certainly overtaken it by now).

More to the point, thanks to its extensive public transport network, London is integrated, in a way none of the others are: an investment in the centre will have benefits for the whole. 

That isn't true of the other regions. A new branch of Manchester's Metrolink, say, will be great for the bit of suburban Manchester that gets to join the network, but won't be of direct use to much of the North West. That makes it harder to sell to the voters. 

Crossrail, though, can be sold as project that'll benefit all Londoners – not to mention those who commute in from the counties surrounding it. It's not an exaggeration to say that a fifth of the British population live somewhere in the project's orbit. 

Result: politicians are more likely to prioritise another Crossrail than they are incremental improvements elsewhere. 

(And yes, this does mean that London's existing transport network gets it to the front of the queue for more transport investments. More on this below.)

2) Economics

The UK economy is ludicrously over-centralised. London generates a disproportionate share of UK GDP; London generates a disproportionate share of UK tax.

All of which, one suspects, makes it easier for projects in London to get the green light from the the cost-benefit analysis which the Treasury uses to make spending decisions. Okay, the project costs a bomb... but, wow, look at the benefits!

It'd be difficult to make the same case for, say, a metro in Bradford.

There's more:

3) Funding

The government also tends to smile on projects where it doesn't have to pay the entire cost. Businesses in London were so desperate for Crossrail that they were happy – at least, after a fashion – to contribute to it through the business rate supplement.

Couldn't northern businesses do the same, to show support for transport elsewhere? Well, yes – but there are fewer of them, and they're not as rich. And most importantly of all...

4) It's a self-fulfilling prophecy

...they're not dependent on an over-crowded public transport system to get their staff to work – because there isn't one – so they're less likely to feel the need to stump up. London businesses, though, are dependent on a decent public transport network. Those elsewhere are not.

In other words, this whole disparity in funding is self-perpetuating. If London transport breaks, then it will genuinely hit London's businesses, and that in turn will hit the national economy and the national Treasury. The capital is addicted to transport spending, and the country needs the capital.

Oh, and:

5) Bubble

The people who make the decisions are almost entirely based in London. So yes, that's probably a factor too. 

I'm not saying this is good. It's very, very un-good. It's deeply, ludicrously unfair that, because London is richer and more dependent on public transport, that means it gets the lion's share of funding forever more. It's crazy.

But it's also really difficult to see how we get out of this. If we don't invest in public transport in Leeds, well, sucks to be Leeds, but the rest of us will just get on with our day. If we don't invest in public transport in London, then the country might actually start to break. 

And so, we're stuck. 

For what it's worth, this is one of the reasons I'm in favour of devolution. Those theoretical Bradford and Leeds metros might never rise up the national agenda. But they'd be pretty important to any West Yorkshire city region that may one day emerge. (Many of the extensions of Manchester Metrolink have come about precisely because the 10 boroughs worked together to push for them.)

Until then, though, you can expect to see more graphs like the one the IPPR produced above, basically forever more. I'm not saying it's good. I'm just saying it is. Sorry.

Jonn Elledge is the editor of CityMetric. He is on Twitter, far too much, as @jonnelledge.

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How the rise of anti-crime politics caused lasting harm to Black Americans

"I see an awareness that has developed in the Black community in the last 10 years or so about how deeply racist the criminal justice system has become," James Forman Jr. says. (David McNew/Getty Images)

The police killing of George Floyd, and the protest movement that emerged from it, has reinvigorated a national conversation around reinventing criminal justice policy in the United States.

At the same time, reports that violent crime is rising in many US cities have resurrected talk of the much-disputed “Ferguson effect,” a theory put forward by law enforcement professionals, and some researchers, who argued that police slowdowns in the wake of the first wave of Black Lives Matter protests resulted in elevated rates of violent crime. President Donald Trump is trying to weaponise this narrative, paired with images of federal officers clashing with protesters in the streets of Portland, to wage a 1968-style backlash election campaign.

“People who want to mobilise a lock-them-up style of either policing or prosecution have tried to weaponise those short-term increases,” says James Forman Jr., professor of law at Yale Law School. “Criminologists will say you have to be very, very cautious about short-term movement [in crime statistics]. We don't know whether or not what we're seeing right now [with violent crime increasing] is going to sustain itself. But the fact is, it's here and people are talking about it.”

In 2018, Forman won the Pulitzer Prize in nonfiction for his book Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black America. Drawing on his experience as a public defender in Washington, DC, he traced the emergence of anti-crime politics in late 20th century Black communities. Forman showed how newly empowered Black politicians fought for policies they believed would protect and uplift Black Americans, but inadvertently contributed to mass incarceration. 


CityMetric recently caught up with Forman to discuss crime trends, where he sees reason for hope in this moment and how the Black political class’s attitude toward crime and punishment has shifted since the latter part of the 20th century. 

This interview has been edited and condensed. 

There is talk right now about a resurgence of crime and violence in American cities. We saw similar, more localised concerns after the initial 2015 Black Lives Matter protests in Ferguson and Baltimore. Do you fear this could reinvigorate the kind of politics you describe in your book among segments of the Black community and political class?

I fear that it could be reinvigorated nationally and also in the Black political class. Look at the political conversations that are happening in Atlanta right now, for example, a city that also has seen a short-term uptick in crime as it is a site of a lot of protests about George Floyd and Breonna Taylor on the national level, as well as Rayshard Brooks and Ahmaud Arbery more locally in Georgia.

I think that you can already see in some of the language of the local elected officials this idea that we have to be very careful about pulling back. [They are saying] “while the protesters may make some valid points, we can't risk returning to the ‘80s and ‘90s.” Those decades really traumatised the United States, and particularly traumatised Black communities. There's a deep fear about returning to the levels of the violence that we saw in the crack years.

You write a lot about class divides among Black Americans, where middle income and elite Black people don't suffer as much from extremely punitive policies. They also have closer ties to the politicians who are creating these policies. There are very specific groups of people, even in marginalised communities, whose voices are heard.  As a result of these dynamics, you write about Black politicians fighting for things like mandatory minimum prison sentences or against decriminalising marijuana. Is there still that disconnect between those who suffer the most from criminal justice policies and those who are actually heard in political discourse?  

Let me just say a caveat, that when we talk about class divisions in the Black community it's important to hold two truths in our head at the same time. Bruce Western and others have shown the way in which class, educational status, income can dramatically reduce the likelihood of being hardest hit by the criminal system – namely incarcerated. Middle class and upper middle class Black people get some measure of protection. It's also true at the same time that Black people of all classes are worse off relative to their class counterparts in the white community. 

One area where class is least protective is policing and police stops. The police do not know how many degrees you have. They don't know how much money you have in your bank account. I want to be very clear that in making this point about class, I'm not making the argument that race or racism don't matter in this context. 

In terms of how it plays out now, I see an awareness that has developed in the Black community in the last 10 years or so about how deeply racist the criminal justice system has become. Twenty or 30 years ago they had a consciousness, but there's levels of understanding. Many of the people I write about in the book wanted to promote the interests of the Black community. They weren't motivated by indifference or callousness. When presented with mounting evidence of how awful this system has been in Black lives, they're reconsidering and recalibrating. 

Lots of former elected officials have said to me some version of “I didn't know at the time and I appreciate that you showed us in our full complexity. I appreciate that you showed the pressures we were under. If I had known then what I know now, maybe I would have been less quick to go along with some of these harsh measures.” 

The second thing that has affected the Black political class has been the emerging movements, led by Black people in particular and led by young people. They not only educated leaders, but pressured them and made them understand that there is a political cost. If you're not moved by the moral argument, then you'll be moved by the political argument. You'll be moved by the people protesting outside the office of District Attorney Jackie Lacey in Los Angeles, for example, where Black Lives Matter LA has held, I believe, a year of consecutive protests against a Black district attorney who has had really some of the worst practices.

From what I can tell, she's been pressured by the movement to change some of her positions on important issues like prosecution of low-level drug offenders, for example, and the aggressiveness with which she prosecutes police officers for acts of violence.

What do you make of the calls to defend or even abolish the police?

What I find so compelling about abolition, initially in the prison context and extended to the police as well, is that it shifts the conversation and forces us to go through experiments in which we imagine what it would take to build that world. I think that exercise is very important, because it pushes us further than we are naturally inclined to go. Cultivating a broader imagination is an incredibly important part of this work, because as you know from my book, often it was lack of imagination that caused people to fall back on [punitive policies]. 

That's what caused D.C. Councilmember David Clarke to call the police rather than public health experts when he was overwhelmed with letters about heroin addicts in public space. He was anti-drug war, but he couldn't imagine responding to a call for help with heroin addicts with anything other than police. That's a very common move from even really good and progressive people. 

People who are for defunding, for abolition, are absolutely right about reinvesting that money into alternative structures that support communities. But the reinvestment part doesn't follow naturally from the terms. We might want to come up with a term that captures the new stuff we want to do. I think that's particularly important because one of the reasons Black communities have ended up supporting more police is that Black communities have always wanted their fair share of the resources.

Then, the evidence suggests the United States has too many police officers doing prophylactic, preventative, or stop-and-frisk style policing. The style of policing that leads to district level harassment, pulling people over for no reason. But we have too little investment in the parts of police departments that investigate unsolved crimes. I'm talking about the investigator or the detective who comes to your house after there's been a robbery, an assault, a rape, or homicide. 

As compared to European countries, in the United States we actually underinvest in those parts of our police departments. Jill Leovy’s book Ghettoside shows this in dramatic detail. She describes an LAPD that's stopping and frisking Black drivers wantonly and yet the homicide detectives are still relying on a fax machine and the fax machine is broken. They have to go with their own money to Staples to buy a printer. Meanwhile, other aspects of the department are kitted out in this ridiculous riot gear that makes them look like they're in Fallujah. 

That under investment is particularly damaging to Black communities because we're disproportionately victimised by crime. Because of racism and this allocation of resources, the police are less likely to respond in Black communities. The kids I used to work with in the charter schools in DC, we talk about no snitching, but one of the reasons they would never call the police after they'd been victimised by crime is they would say, “They're not even going to come. You're wasting time.” 

I did a Q&A with Jill Leovy too and her argument is one I've struggled to articulate in our present moment. She argues the state doesn't have a monopoly on violence in low-income Black neighbourhoods, because investigations of violence are deemphasised and crime victims or their loved ones often take retribution into their own hands.  But right now, establishing or preserving the state's monopoly on violence isn't an appealing talking point. 

Yes, this is another thing nobody's talking about. Whatever we're going to do instead of the police has to be accountable to the public. The best, most direct way to have accountability is to have the individuals be public employees. As long as we have 300 million guns in this country at least some of those state employees are going to themselves be armed. It's unreasonable to ask them to do the job without it. Not as many need to be armed as are armed now, but some of them need to be. But they can't be hiding behind union contracts or civil service protections which make it impossible to remove even the worst performing, most abusive officers. 

We can not call them police if we want to. That's semantic, but maybe symbolism matters. But those people have to be state employees. They can work with community-based nonprofits, but there are also communities that don't have as robust of a nonprofit network, and they deserve protection too. These [community] groups have to be accountable to the state and, when they don't exist, the state has to be there. 

Progressives get all the points I just made when it's applied to education. The notion that things be public and accountable to the state is understood when it comes to schools. It's exactly why so many people on the left are opposed to charter schools, because they say they don't have public accountability. They want these things to be a state function. But this point about the difficulty in removing this entirely from the hands of the state is, I think, one that liberals and progressives understand from other contexts.

Jake Blumgart is a staff writer at CityMetric.