Can population density predict voting preference?

This cow's a Tory, for a start. Image: Getty.

Since the general election, experts have been wondering how the pollsters got their prediction so wrong. While they focus on polling problems and methodology, we have explored human geography fundamentals. Interestingly, we find that there is a correlation between voter preference and population density.

In order to undertake this analysis, we have analysed the vote share from the 2015 general election for both the Conservative and Labour Parties across every constituency and plotted this against the population density (taken from the 2011 Census). Unsurprisingly, two things jump out. First, there appears to be a positive correlation between population density and vote share. But secondly, this correlation is by no means a perfect fit – constituencies are complex geographies with a variety of different and competing pressures located within them.

Vote share and population density. Source: Electoral Commission, ONS, NLP analysis.

In order to simplify this analysis, a trend line has been added (a logarithmic one, as it best represents the data). This trend line provides an equation which we can use as a model for both Labour and Conservative vote share and population density.

Indeed, the two models seem to work quite successfully – using both models to predict the vote share given a particular population density, and comparing the result with the real result in the election, the models correctly predict the party with the largest vote share three quarters of the time.

Figure 2b

Smoothed vote share proportion and population density. Source: NLP analysis.

Of course, a lot of this analysis simply reaffirms what we could already predict – Labour does well in higher density urban areas while the Conservatives do well in lower density shires. However, the real interest lies in the intersection at which the vote share is so close – around a density of 16-17 people per hectare.


Constituencies with population densities around this crossover point include the key marginal seats of Bury North, Lincoln, Stevenage, Telford, Thurrock and Wirral West. Moreover, of the 32 constituencies near to this modelled crossover point, 24 have Green Belt land located within them, accounting for 52 per cent of their combined land area.

What will be interesting is to see is how influential Green Belt policy and/or associated housing pressures and requirements will be on the local politics of these constrained areas – are these places more likely than other areas to foster a productive conversation about the policy choices over how to plan for housing? Or are they perhaps less?

Joe Sarling is associate director of the planning consultancy Nathanial Lichfield & Partners. This article was originally posted on the firm’s blog.

 
 
 
 

What does the fate of Detroit tell us about the future of Silicon Valley?

Detroit, 2008. Image: Getty.

There was a time when California’s Santa Clara Valley, bucolic home to orchards and vineyards, was known as “the valley of heart’s delight”. The same area was later dubbed “Silicon Valley,” shorthand for the high-tech combination of creativity, capital and California cool. However, a backlash is now well underway – even from the loyal gadget-reviewing press. Silicon Valley increasingly conjures something very different: exploitation, excess, and elitist detachment.

Today there are 23 active Superfund toxic waste cleanup sites in Santa Clara County, California. Its culture is equally unhealthy: Think of the Gamergate misogynist harassment campaigns, the entitled “tech bros” and rampant sexism and racism in Silicon Valley firms. These same companies demean the online public with privacy breaches and unauthorised sharing of users’ data. Thanks to the companies’ influences, it’s extremely expensive to live in the area. And transportation is so clogged that there are special buses bringing tech-sector workers to and from their jobs. Some critics even perceive threats to democracy itself.

In a word, Silicon Valley has become toxic.

Silicon Valley’s rise is well documented, but the backlash against its distinctive culture and unscrupulous corporations hints at an imminent twist in its fate. As historians of technology and industry, we find it helpful to step back from the breathless champions and critics of Silicon Valley and think about the long term. The rise and fall of another American economic powerhouse – Detroit – can help explain how regional reputations change over time.

The rise and fall of Detroit

The city of Detroit became a famous node of industrial capitalism thanks to the pioneers of the automotive age. Men such as Henry Ford, Horace and John Dodge, and William Durant cultivated Detroit’s image as a centre of technical novelty in the early 20th century.

The very name “Detroit” soon became a metonym for the industrial might of the American automotive industry and the source of American military power. General Motors president Charles E. Wilson’s remark that, “For years I thought what was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa,” was an arrogant but accurate account of Detroit’s place at the heart of American prosperity and global leadership.

The public’s view changed after the 1950s. The auto industry’s leading firms slid into bloated bureaucratic rigidity and lost ground to foreign competitors. By the 1980s, Detroit was the image of blown-out, depopulated post-industrialism.

In retrospect – and perhaps as a cautionary tale for Silicon Valley – the moral decline of Detroit’s elite was evident long before its economic decline. Henry Ford became famous in the pre-war era for the cars and trucks that carried his name, but he was also an anti-Semite, proto-fascist and notorious enemy of organised labor. Detroit also was the source of defective and deadly products that Ralph Nader criticized in 1965 as “unsafe at any speed”. Residents of the region now bear the costs of its amoral industrial past, beset with high unemployment and poisonous drinking water.


A new chapter for Silicon Valley

If the story of Detroit can be simplified as industrial prowess and national prestige, followed by moral and economic decay, what does that say about Silicon Valley? The term “Silicon Valley” first appeared in print in the early 1970s and gained widespread use throughout the decade. It combined both place and activity. The Santa Clara Valley, a relatively small area south of the San Francisco Bay, home to San Jose and a few other small cities, was the base for a computing revolution based on silicon chips. Companies and workers flocked to the Bay Area, seeking a pleasant climate, beautiful surroundings and affordable land.

By the 1980s, venture capitalists and companies in the Valley had mastered the silicon arts and were getting filthy, stinking rich. This was when “Silicon Valley” became shorthand for an industrial cluster where universities, entrepreneurs and capital markets fuelled technology-based economic development. Journalists fawned over successful companies like Intel, Cisco and Google, and analysts filled shelves with books and reports about how other regions could become the “next Silicon Valley”.

Many concluded that its culture set it apart. Boosters and publications like Wired magazine celebrated the combination of the Bay Area hippie legacy with the libertarian individualism embodied by the late Grateful Dead lyricist John Perry Barlow. The libertarian myth masked some crucial elements of Silicon Valley’s success – especially public funds dispersed through the U.S. Defense Department and Stanford University.

The ConversationIn retrospect, perhaps that ever-expanding gap between Californian dreams and American realities led to the undoing of Silicon Valley. Its detachment from the lives and concerns of ordinary Americans can be seen today in the unhinged Twitter rants of automaker Elon Musk, the extreme politics of PayPal co-founder Peter Thiel, and the fatuous dreams of immortality of Google’s vitamin-popping director of engineering, Ray Kurzweil. Silicon Valley’s moral decline has never been clearer, and it now struggles to survive the toxic mess it has created.

Andrew L. Russell, Dean, College of Arts & Sciences; Professor of History, SUNY Polytechnic Institute and Lee Vinsel, Assistant Professor of Science and Technology Studies, Virginia Tech.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.