How a dam in Volgograd has almost killed off the caviar fish

Volgograd. Image: Getty.

Yesterday, the floodlights were turned on at the newly built Volgograd Arena for the first World Cup match to be held there, between England and Tunisia.

But, as an expert in the illegal caviar trade, I know Volgograd because the energy powering those same floodlights will be generated by the nearby Volgograd HydroElectric Station. This is the largest hydro power plant in Europe, and a dam which has played a pivotal role in driving sturgeon – the source of the iconic Russian delicacy, black caviar – to the brink of extinction.

The 725m long and 44m high concrete giant sits about 20km outside the city centre and dissects Europe’s longest and most powerful river, the Volga. Construction began in the 1950s, as part of post-war industrialisation initiatives known as the “Great Construction Projects of Communism”. This in a city which during the World War II – when it was known as Stalingrad – was the site of one of the bloodiest battles in history. The dam was completed in 1961 and today produces around 12 billion KW-hours of energy a year.

The Volga flows 3,500km northwards from the Caspian Sea. One of its tributaries even reaches Moscow. Image: Kmusser/Wikimedia Commons.

The station was groundbreaking in both scale and energetic output. For a few years, it may have been the single largest power plant in the world. But despite the benefits to the climate of “clean” hydro-powered energy, the Volgograd station has been particularly damaging for the sturgeon species that attempt to migrate from the Caspian Sea to reproduce in the upper reaches of the Volga.

Russia’s pride

Sturgeon, affectionately referred to as “Tsar Fish” are perhaps more critically endangered than any other group of species on the planet. There are 27 species in all, of which four are found in the Volga: Russian sturgeon, sterlet, stellate, and the beluga which is famous for producing the world’s finest caviar.

These fish are often described as “living fossils”. They’ve been around since dinosaurs walked the earth 150m years ago, and individual fish can live for more than a century. Sturgeon have attained a cultural and historical significance in Russia and are a source of national pride.

But socioeconomic change in Russia has been disastrous for these fish. Their rivers have been polluted, fragmented and dammed and this – along with overfishing and poaching for caviar – has caused populations in the Volga to plummet by 90 per cent since 1970.

A slow reproductive cycle means numbers cannot recover quickly. Females do not carry eggs annually, they take many years to reach sexual maturity and, of the 250,000 - 400,000 eggs they can release at one time, only two or three fish will survive.

Damming and decline

As the last of eight hydroelectric works in the Volga-Kama cascade of dams, the Volgograd Hydroelectric station is the first barrier sturgeon migrating upstream from the Caspian Sea will encounter. In theory sturgeon can pass the dam thanks to a hydraulic fish-lift in the original design. However, it is not clear whether the lift is still operational and, even if it is, its benefits have been counteracted by further dams built upstream. Even if fish do manage to cross the dam, the return journey can prove fatal, as it often requires passing through turbines that can weigh as much as a 747 aeroplane.

The Volgograd Hydroelectric station not only blocks sturgeon migration, but alters the natural flow and temperature of the river. Sturgeon are very sensitive and rely upon signals such as flow speed and temperature to determine when and where to reproduce. Therefore, the dam is said to have directly reduced the spawning grounds of sturgeon from 3,600 hectares to only 430 hectares. For beluga sturgeon in particular, 90 per cent of their natural spawning grounds have disappeared as a result of the Volgograd dam.


An illegal caviar trade is flourishing

It is undeniable that the Volgograd station has played a part in the demise of the Russian caviar industry. Due to rapidly declining wild sturgeon populations, Russia banned commercial sturgeon fishing and black caviar exports in 2002. Now, Russia allows just 9 tonnes of the delicacy to be sold on the domestic market annually, produced by a few government-regulated fish farms. These farms cannot come close to producing enough caviar to meet Russian, let alone worldwide, demand. As a result an illegal trade meets the shortfall, with reports suggesting that 250 tonnes of illegal caviar are produced each year.

Unsurprisingly then, almost all migrating spawners are poached below the Volgograd dam, and a particular hotspot is Russia’s so-called “Caviar Capital”, Astrakhan, around 400km downstream from Volgograd. There, illegal poaching of sturgeon and trade in caviar is said to be rampant – and beluga caviar fetches up to $10,000/kg. This has devastating ecological impacts – when sturgeon are removed at this point in the river the fish have not had the chance to reproduce.

Save the sturgeon

The situation looks bleak. Despite Russia releasing 50m or more sturgeon raised in hatcheries, there is sparse evidence that restocking is successful. In fact, despite such releases there has been an overall decline over the past decade. And it seems counter-intuitive to release millions of juvenile sturgeon when the Volgograd dam still prevents their migration and spawning – and given that downstream poaching is rife. Greater enforcement against poaching would be a good start, along with assertive efforts to help fish move along their natural rivers. (Something similar has helped shortnose sturgeon in the US.)

The ConversationSo, for football fans visiting Volgograd for the World Cup the best way to help sturgeon is to avoid the lure of purchasing any black caviar as souvenirs. But, if you are that way inclined, make sure to stick to customs regulations and try your utmost to ensure the caviar is from reputable farmed sources.

Hannah Dickinson, PhD Researcher in Wildlife Trafficking, University of Sheffield.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

 
 
 
 

Businesses need less office and retail space than ever. So what does this mean for cities?

Boarded up shops in Quebec City. Image: Getty.

As policymakers develop scenarios for Brexit, researchers speculate about its impact on knowledge-intensive business services. There is some suggestion that higher performing cities and regions will face significant structural changes.

Financial services in particular are expected to face up to £38bn in losses, putting over 65,000 jobs at risk. London is likely to see the back of large finance firms – or at least, sizable components of them – as they seek alternatives for their office functions. Indeed, Goldman Sachs has informed its employees of impending relocation, JP Morgan has purchased office space in Dublin’s docklands, and banks are considering geographical dispersion rather concentration at a specific location.

Depending on the type of business, some high-order service firms will behave differently. After all, depreciation of sterling against the euro can be an opportunity for firms seeking to take advantage of London’s relative affordability and its highly qualified labour. Still, it is difficult to predict how knowledge-intensive sectors will behave in aggregate.

Strategies other than relocation are feasible. Faced with economic uncertainty, knowledge-intensive businesses in the UK may accelerate the current trend of reducing office space, of encouraging employees to work from a variety of locations, and of employing them on short-term contracts or project-based work. Although this type of work arrangement has been steadily rising, it is only now beginning to affect the core workforce.

In Canada – also facing uncertainty as NAFTA is up-ended – companies are digitising work processes and virtualising workspace. The benefits are threefold: shifting to flexible workspaces can reduce real-estate costs; be attractive to millennial workers who balk at sitting in an office all day; and reduces tension between contractual and permanent staff, since the distinction cannot be read off their location in an office. While in Canada these shifts are usually portrayed as positive, a mark of keeping up with the times, the same changes can also reflect a grimmer reality.  

These changes have been made possible by the rise in mobile communication technologies. Whereas physical presence in an office has historically been key to communication, coordination and team monitoring, these ends can now be achieved without real-estate. Of course, offices – now places to meet rather than places to perform the substance of consulting, writing and analysing – remain necessary. But they can be down-sized, with workers performing many tasks at home, in cafés, in co-working spaces or on the move. This shifts the cost of workspace from employer to employee, without affecting the capacity to oversee, access information, communicate and coordinate.

What does this mean for UK cities? The extent to which such structural shifts could be beneficial or detrimental is dependent upon the ability of local governments to manage the situation.


This entails understanding the changes companies are making and thinking through their consequences: it is still assumed, by planners and in many urban bylaws and regulations, that buildings have specific uses, that economic activity occurs in specific neighbourhoods and clusters, and that this can be understood and regulated. But as increasing numbers of workers perform their economic activities across the city and along its transport networks, new concepts are needed to understand how the economy permeates cities, how ubiquitous economic activity can be coordinated with other city functions, such as housing, public space, transport, entertainment, and culture; and, crucially, how it can translate into revenue for local governments, who by-and-large rely on property taxes.

It’s worth noting that changes in the role of real-estate are also endemic in the retail sector, as shopping shifts on-line, and as many physical stores downsize or close. While top flight office and retail space may remain attractive as a symbolic façade, the ensuing surplus of Class B (older, less well located) facilities may kill off town-centres.

On the other hand, it could provide new settings within which artists and creators, evicted from their decaying nineteenth century industrial spaces (now transformed into expensive lofts), can engage in their imaginative and innovative pursuits. Other types of creative and knowledge work can also be encouraged to use this space collectively to counter isolation and precarity as they move from project to project.

Planners and policymakers should take stock of these changes – not merely reacting to them as they arise, but rethinking the assumptions that govern how they believe economic activity interacts with, and shapes, cities. Brexit and other fomenters of economic uncertainty exacerbate these trends, which reduce fixed costs for employers, but which also shift costs and uncertainty on to employees and cities.

But those who manage and study cities need to think through what these changes will mean for urban spaces. As the display, coordination and supervision functions enabled by real-estate – and, by extension, by city neighbourhoods – Increasingly transfer on-line, it’s worth asking: what roles do fixed locations now play in the knowledge economy?

Filipa Pajević is a PhD student at the School of Urban Planning, McGill University, researching the spatial underpinnings of mobile knowledge. She tweets as @filipouris. Richard Shearmur is currently director of the School, and has published extensively on the geography of innovation and on location in the urban economy.